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Introduction 
Ireland's participation in the EMS, the introduction of exchange controls, and 
the break in the traditional parity between the Irish pound and sterling brought 
about a totally new environment in which changes in domestic bank liquidity came 
to play an important role in determining the level of Irish interest rates. 
This paper looks at the main influences on bank liquidity and examines the 
sources of changes in it over recent years since 1975, with particular reference to 
1979 and 1980. The purpose is to highlight the relationships between bank liquidity 
and the Government Borrowing Requirement and show how the manner in which 
the Government finances its deficit can affect the level of interest rates. 
The size of the annual Government deficit has now grown to such large 
proportions that the manner in which it is financed has become an important policy 
issue. By illustrating the effects on interbank rates and gilt yields it is hoped that the 
paper will contribute to the debate about whether the deficit should be financed by 
monetary or non-monetary means and whether the Government should borrow 
abroad or from the Central Bank. 
Exchequer Financing and Bank Liquidity 
Technically, bank liquidity may be defined as the ability of the commercial 
banking system to place deposits with the Central Bank. In practical terms it has to 
do with changes in the amount of mo,ney in the system and the associated movement 
in interest rates. 
Very many factors affect the level of bank liquidity such as the size of the trade 
deficit and capital flows, but one of the most important, if only because of its size, is 
the Government Borrowing Requirement. In 1980, for example, this amounted to 
£1,217m. or 14\/z per cent of GNP. 
The money market is influenced on a daily basis by the levels of Government 
disbursements and revenues. In general, all other things being equal, a net 
disbursement causes bank liquidity to improve and tends to put downward pressure 
on interest rates. Government deposits at the Central Bank are reduced and bankers' 
primary liquidity or balances at the Central Bank are increased. 
* John Conway is an employee of the Investment Bank of Ireland Limited. This article is adapted 
from a paper entitled "Irish Commercial Bank Liquidity" read to the 3rd Annual Dublin Economics 
Workshop Policy Conference at Killarney, October 1980. The author wishes to acknowlege the help and 
comments of referees. He remains solely responsible for errors and omissions and all opinions expressed. 
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However, the Government must finance these disbursements one way or 
another. They represent an obligation on the part of the Government to pay, and it 
may do so simply by printing the money, borrowing from the banking system, from 
external sources, or from the non-bank private sector. The manner of financing will 
have different implications for bank liquidity, interest rates and long bond yields. 
If the Government funds from the non-bank private sector, through small 
savings or gilt sales, there will be an offsetting fall in a bank account elsewhere in the 
system, so the net effect on liquidity is nil. However, the more the Government 
wants to borrow through fixed interest securities, the higher the yield level at which 
it must do so. Should funding from the non-bank private sector exceed net 
disbursements in any period, the effect is a squeeze on liquidity. 
If the Government funds by borrowing from the commercial banks, a matching 
asset is created in the combined balance sheet of the commercial banking system, the 
money supply expands but again the net effect on liquidity is nil. However, if the 
Government borrows from the Central Bank, this will improve liquidity, since there 
is an injection of funds into the commercial banking system. All other things being 
equal, interest rates would tend to fall. 
The effect on liquidity of the Government borrowing abroad depends on how 
this affects the balance of payments and official reserves position. A trade deficit 
will drain liquidity because in effect, bank deposits are converted into imported 
goods. A capital outflow similarly causes a drain. But this can be neutralised by 
Government foreign borrowing which leaves official reserves unchanged. 
Conversely, a trade surplus, capital inflow, or indeed a rise in official external 
reserves for whatever reason will cause an improvement in liquidity because it 
creates commercial bank deposits, and thereby improves the banks' ability to place 
deposits with the Central Bank. 
Developments during 1975-1978 
The period 1975-1978 was in the sterling parity, pre-EMS era. The fixed 
exchange rate and free access to the London market meant that Irish interest rates 
were determined by those in the UK. Because the rules of the game were different 
then, an analysis of changes in Irish bank liquidity during those years is of little 
relevance to understanding interest rates movements today. However, a few points 
are worth noting from Table 1. 
(i) In 1975/76, increases in official foreign reserves were the major source of bank 
liquidity. The Governmerit borrowed abroad, despite the fact that the balance 
of payments deficits were low, and used the money to build up its balances at 
the Central Bank. One activity tended to neutralise the effect on liquidity of 
the other, but the extent of foreign borrowing was greater than the buildup in 
Government balances at the Central Bank. 
(ii) In 1977, Government foreign borrowing was much lower, but the rise in 
official external reserves was due mainly to a rise in the net external liability of 
the commercial banking system. The strong expansion in credit could not be 
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met from domestic monetary sources, and borrowing from the London market 
was necessary. 
(iii) In 1978 the Government partly ran down the deposits which it had built up 
over the previous three years with the Central Bank, and this was the major 
source of liquidity in that year. The change in the official external reserves was 
minimal. 
TABLE 1: Sources of Changes in Unborrowed Bank Liquidity 1975-1979 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Currency -45 -49 -47 -79 -121 
Official External reserves + 181 +280 +245 +51 -277 
Change in government position* at 
Central Bank -69 -105 -61 + 100 + 112 
of which: 
1 Govt. deposits** 
Central Bank -107 -97 -65 + 104 + 13 
2 Govt. securities at Central Bank +52 -8 +4 -4 +96 
3 Exchequer Overdraft Facility -14 +3 
Total change in liquidity +67 + 126 + 137 +72 -286 
Source: 
Central Bank Quarterly Bulletins. 
Notes: 
* An increase in government indebtedness to the Central Bank or a reduction in its balances at the Bank 
is denoted by a plus sign. 
**An increase in government deposits at the Central Bank is denoted by a minus sign because it has an 
adverse effect on bank liquidity. 
The data in these tables have been extracted from the Consolidated Balance Sheet of the banking 
system and the Summary of Assets and Liabilities of the Central Bank in the Statistical Appendix to 
Central Bank Bulletins. 
Developments during 1979 
In 1979, the situation in Irish financial markets changed radically. The break in 
the link with sterling and the separation of the two capital markets caused severe 
adjustment problems. 
Table 2 shows the sources of changes in bank liquidity on a quarterly basis over 
the year. The graph shows the movement of the three month interbank rate, the 
Associated Banks' Prime Lending rate and the yield on a long dated Government 
security. 
From an initial over-stretched position - there was a shortfall in secondary 
liquidity of £103m for the Associated banks and £84m for the licenced banking 
system as a whole at the beginning of the year - liquidity deteriorated markedly and 
necessitated very substantial support from the Central Bank. This support peaked at 
£416m at the end of the third quarter. The position at the end of December was 
complicated by the phased adjustment to the new primary and secondary liquidity 
ratios. 
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Clearly, the fall in the level of official external reserves was the major 
contributory cause of the liquidity squeeze. They stood at £1,252m at the end of 
December 1978. By the end of 1979 they were £975m, a fall of £277m or 22%. This 
happened because the size of the trade deficit was much higher than originally 
forecast, due mainly to the doubling of our oil import bill, but also to the excessive 
growth in domestic credit. Public sector foreign borrowing for the year was in the 
region of £500m. Had the government not funded abroad, the loss of reserves and 
the liquidity squeeze would have been even more severe. The rise in Government 
indebtedness to the Central Bank of £112m also tended to mitigate the severity of the 
squeeze. 
TABLE 2: Major Sources of Changes in Bank Liquidity During 1979 (£m) 
l. Unborrowed Liquidity 
Full 
QI Q2 Q3 Q4 year 
Currency -13 -28 -40 -40 -121 
External reserves -114 -144 -60 +41 -277 
Change in govt. position at 
Central Bank -55 +235 -14 -54 + 112 
Of which: 
1 Govt. deposits at Central Bank -100 + 197 + 15 -99 + 13 
2 Govt. securities at Central Bank +36 +47 -29 +42 +96 
3 Exchequer 0/D Facility 3 +3 
4 Exchequer Bills at Central Bank 9 -9 
2. Borrowed Liquidity 
l Bills Rediscounted 
i ACIBS* -11 -11 
ii Exchequer Bills +53 -11 +42 
+42 -11 + 31 
2. Central Bank Advances 
i Secured Advances to Assoc. Banks + 134 +85 +57 -52 +224 
ii Short term credit facility + 11 + 33 + 13 +57 
Total Central Bank Support + 176 +96 +90 -50 + 312 
3. Secondary liquidity short/ all +27 +16 -30 n.a. n.a. 
* Agricultural Commodity Intervention Bills. 
n.a. = not applicable (see text). 
Sources: Central Bank Quarterly Bulletins. 
27 
(i) First half 1979 
An examination of the figures on a quarterly basis will reveal that in the first 
quarter the seasonally heavy trade deficit took its toll on official external reserves. 
Also there was a large volume of net gilt sales reflected in a £100m rise in 
Government deposits at the Central Bank. As a result, private sector credit growth 
(up 7 .40Jo) far outstripped the increase in M3 (up 4.1 OJo) and there was a marked 
deterioration in the liquidity position of the banks, especially the Associated Banks. 
Their indebtedness to the Central Bank rose by £176m. The non-Associated Banks' 
position was eased by foreign currency swaps whereby they borrowed short-term in 
sterling, converted into Irish pounds and covered forward at the Central Bank. This 
operation had the dual effect of boosting foreign exchange reserves, on the one 
hand, which was desirable from the authorities' point of view, and at the same time 
providing the banks with Irish pound resources. Because the interest differential 
between London and Dublin was at the time quite large, funds could be borrowed 
short-term in London on a covered basis at rates which were more favourable than 
those prevailing in the Dublin interbank market. Unfortunately, no official data are 
available on the size of foreign currency swaps, so it is difficult to assess the 
importance of their contribution tb liquidity during the year. 
In the second quarter, the steady repurchase of Government stock by the 
authorities, along with the postponement in Exchequer revenue due to the postal 
dispute, almost completely depleted Government deposits at the Central Bank. They 
fell by £197m. In the same period the Central Bank increased its holding of 
Government paper by £47m and the total contribution to liquidity from changes in 
the Government position at the Central Bank was £235m. This was partly offset by a 
further fall in official external reserves of £144m. 
During April and May conditions in the interbank market were generally easier 
than in the first quarter and this was reflected in a small fall in the three month 
interbank rate from its level at the end of March. Short-term money rates fluctuated 
between 13% and 14%. This was due to the volume of gilt-edged stock - perhaps 
£100m - repurchased by the authorities from the institutions combined with the 
very low expansion in domestic credit - £26m in the two months - by the non-
Associated banks. These banks did run down their net external liability by £125m in 
the two months but because of the modest credit demand which they experienced 
they were able to accommodate this element of refinancing without undue strain. 
The position in June altered appreciably. Domestic credit expansion by the non-
Associated banks in that month alone amounted to £80m - a rise of 5 OJo. Private 
sector credit expansion by the Associated banks was buoyant throughout the quarter 
- a rise of 6.7% - and they were forced to increase their borrowing from the 
Central Bank. Because of the excessive growth in credit the bulk of this additional 
accommodation was provided at increasingly penal rates. 
These influences put obvious pressure on liquidity and money market rates. To 
compound the strains, gilt prices were slashed by about nine points in a pre-emptive 
move by the authorities to resume funding and £100m flowed out of the money 
market into the Exchequer in the last two weeks of June. This was in part reflected 
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in a rise of £54m in Government deposits at the Central Bank between end-May and 
end-June. 
Overnight money shot up to over 200/o per annum and three month money to 
about 17 .50/o per annum in response to these developments. Still there were liquidity 
shortages, and the banks had recourse to the Central Bank as lender of last resort. In 
addition to foreign currency swaps which had been in operation for some time, the 
Central Bank established a new short-term credit facility. All licensed banks were 
allocated quotas in proportion to balance sheet size and funds were made available 
on an overnight and up to a seven day basis at an interest rate of 16Y2 0/o per annum 
against the security of Government stock. The maximum facility between all the 
participants was £77 .5m and the declared purpose of the measure was to ease out 
temporary fluctuations in rates while accepting the overall thrust of market forces. 
(Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin No. 2 1979). 
At the end of June, £1 lm or 140Jo of this facility was drawn down. Taking into 
account the very high short rates that were prevailing in the market in the last week 
of June, it is somewhat surprising that a larger proportion of the facility was not 
drawn down. 
As events in the gilt market were clearly orchestrated to resume the funding 
programme one would expect that the authorities would have been at pains to 
recirculate the money back into the system and avoid the acute shortages. It would 
seem appropriate that the full facility should have been drawn down in these 
circumstances but the non-Associated banks themselves were unfamiliar with the 
Central Bank's intentions and suspected that some penalty would attach. 
(ii) Second Half 1979 
The liquidity position did not improve in the third quarter. External reserves 
continued to fall though at a more modest rate. There was a large volume of sales of 
Government stock in August and early September with transfers from the private 
sector to the Exchequer following the end of the postal dispute. The Government 
had minimal recourse to the Central Bank. 
Private sector credit expansion by the Associated banks was modest in July and 
August, but surged in September partly because of the effect of interest debiting. 
This necessitated further recourse to the Central Bank of £57m. Non-Associated 
banks' lending to the private sector continued to be strong and the combined effect 
of rapid credit growth (up 4.90Jo) and a marginal contraction in bank resources kept 
upward pressure on interest rates. 
The rise in Government balances at the Central Bank of £99m between 
September and December 1979 is consistent with the substantial gilt sales which the 
authorities achieved, especially in the early part of November. The negative 
contribution which the Exchequer made to liquidity in the final quarter, of £54m, 
helps explain why interbank rates rose despite other favourable influences which 
tended to improve liquidity. These included exemption from liquidity requirement 
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of domestic foreign currency deposits which were financing increases in foreign 
currency lending within the state, greater use of the Central Bank's short term credit 
facility to the non-Associated banks and foreign currency swaps. In addition, the 
phased implementation of the new liquidity ratios announced on 8 November eased 
the liquidity problems of the Associated banks in particular and permitted them to 
reduce their indebtedness to the Central Bank by £63m (including £1 lm reductions 
in Exchequer bills rediscounted). 
Developments during 1980 to date 
Table 3 analyses the sources and composition of changes in unborrowed bank 
liquidity since the beginning of this year. Because of the delay in the publication of 
data it is not possible to piece together a comprehensive picture at this stage. But the 
main features can be made out. In marked contrast to 1979 there was relative 
stability in the level of our official external reserves in the first six months of the year 
and since then they have increased dramatically. In fact, the turn-round in the 
official reserves position happened from May onwards. Between the April banking 
make-up day and end-November they have risen by about £235m or 25%. It is not a 
coincidence that the precipitate drop in money market rates dates from about the 
same time. _ 
During the first three months of 1980 net gilt sales were running very low due to 
widespread disenchantment with the budget figures. The general expectation had 
been that the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement would be in the region of £800m. 
The £896m that was announced was therefore disappointing, especially when closer 
examination revealed that the out-turn could be significantly higher than this. 
Institutional investors were concerned about the funding implications and were 
reluctant to commit funds to the market. In fact, the authorities had to mark prices 
down smartly to frustrate large-scale attempted selling. Yields on long dated 
Government securities climbed to almost 17% per annum by the end of March. 
With the gilt market effectively closed off as a source of funding, the Exchequer 
had to rely on borrowing from abroad and from the Central Bank. Government 
External debt rose by £132m and this helped finance the seasonally heavy trade 
deficit, leaving official reserves little changed. The Government's position at the 
Central Bank deteriorated by £174m due to a virtual elimination of its deposit 
balances, and this was the main source of the improvement in unborrowed liquidity 
in the period. 
However, total liquidity did not improve and interbank rates changed little in 
consequence. There was at the same time a fall in borrowed liquidity as the banks 
reduced their indebtedness to the Central Bank. Under the new liquidity ratios, the 
banking system was holding secondary liquid assets well in excess of the required 
minimum and adjustment to them involved a switch of £136m in securities from the 
Associated banks to the Central Bank. This allowed the Associated Banks to reduce 
their indebtedness to the Central Bank by about £168m in the quarter. Total Central 
Bank support to the banking system was reduced by £181m. 
30 
TABLE 3: Major Sources and Composition to Changes in 
Unborrowed Bank Liquidity 1980 
£ million 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug 
Currency -49 -6 + 18 -2 +2 +24 +12 +12 
Official External Reserves -33 +67 -47 -31 +28 +22 +50 + 151 
Change in Govt. position 
at Central Bank -10 +64 + 120 +61 -19 + 18 -51 -76 
of which: 
1 Uptake of Govt. Sees. -24 +30 -35 -19 +78 -69 +85 -3 
2 Gov. deposits at 
Central Bank + 10 +38 + 125 -34 +l + 13 -54 -34 
3 Exchequer over-draft 
facility -3 +12 +112 -114 +70 -79 
4 Central Bank uptake 
of Exchequer Bills +7 -4 + 18 +2 + 16 +4 -3 -39 
Total Change in 
Unborrowed Liquidity -92 + 125 +91 +28 +11 +64 +11 +87 
Source: Central Bank Bulletins. 
TABLE 4: Borrowed Liquidity 1980 
£ million 
Ql Q2 
a) Bills Rediscounted 
(1) ACIBs +38 -53 
(2) Exchequer Bills -7 -63 
b) Central Bank Advances 
(1) Secured Advances to Assoc. Banks -199 +40 
(2) Short term credit facility -13 -15 
Total Central Bank Support -181 -91 
Source: Central Bank Bulletins. 
Sept Oct 
-8 +8 
-16 +9 
+149 +83 
+53 -20 
+94 -27 
+2 +92 
+38 
+ 125 +100 
Q3 
-65 
-28 
-93 
Because this support had been very expensive for the banks it was logical that 
the improvement in liquidity should be applied to wind it down. The overall effect 
on total liquidity was, therefore, negligible and the three month interbank rate 
remained above 18% per annum for most of the period. Bank resource growth was 
very sluggish while private sector loan demand remained buoyant. It is difficult to 
understand why these trends diverged so markedly but the trade deficit was high 
even allowing for seasonal factors and it appears that consumer spending was 
holding up well until mid-April. 
Official external reserves began to improve from May onwards due to the 
considerable volume of foreign borrowing that was undertaken by the public sector. 
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Between March and August the External Government Debt rose by £97m and the net 
external liabilities of the State-sponsored bodies increased by £306m. This helps 
explain the rise of £219m in official external reserves which was the major source of 
the improvement in unborrowed bank liquidity in the period. 
Because private sector loan demand was at a standstill, the licensed banks were 
able to further unwind their indebtedness to the Central Bank. They had dispensed 
with the rediscounting facility, amounting to £116m, by 21 May. Borrowings under 
the short-term credit facility were eliminated by 20 August. Curiously, secured 
advances were not eliminated until October. Total liquidity also improved and put 
downward pressure on interest rates in the money market. The three month 
interbank rate fell from 19% per annum at the end of March to 14.75% per annum 
by the end of August. 
These developments all contributed to an improvement in sentiment in the gilt 
edged market. There were heavy purchases of stock by the domestic non-bank 
sector. The Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin No. 3, 1980, states (p. 23) that this 
amounted to £265m in the eight months to end August. Most of this probably 
occurred between March and July. In that four-month period, the yield on a long-
dated Government security fell from 16.8% per annum to 14.08% per annum. 
Developments in late July led to a most extraordinary situation. In the face of 
strong demand the authorities pushed prices ahead and sold out the outstanding 
issues of successive stocks. Offer prices were being made in fewer and fewer stocks 
until the point was reached when the whole market was "Bid only". Although this 
situation lasted for only a short time, the very fact that marketability could be so 
impaired came as a shock to many large investors. 
The high level of gilt funding achieved in the summer months enabled the 
Exchequer to rebuild its deposit balances and repay its overdraft facility at the 
Central Bank. The Central Bank's inventory of Exchequer Bills was also run down. 
In all, the change in the Government's position at the Central Bank took £127m 
of excess liquidity out of the system in July and August. In addition, the commercial 
banks held about £50m in excess of the primary liquidity requirement and about 
£100m over and above their secondary liquidity requirement on the August banking 
reporting date. Interbank rates would have reached lower levels had the Central 
Bank's deposit rate not been held at 13 Yz OJo per annum. 
These excess liquidity conditions have prevailed throughout the remainder of 
1980 as Irish pound private sector credit expansion has continued to be weak. In the 
first ten months of 1980 it increased by 9% or less than £400m. However, the 
Central Bank has acted to prevent a further easing in interest rates. The primary 
liquidity ratio was increased from 10% to 12% with effect from the November bank 
reporting date. This represents an increase of about £100m in the bank's legal 
obligation. In addition, the Central Bank has engaged in currency swaps with some 
banks which have taken funds out of the system. It is not possible, however, to 
quantify this. 
Since August the gilt market has become preoccupied with the extent of this 
year's budget over-run and the implications for the level of funding in 1981. 
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Developments in international markets such as the rise in US prime rates and the 
sharp setback in the Treasury bond market together with the difficulties of monetary 
control in the UK have also been a cause of concern. It is doubtful that the 
authorities have achieved significant net funding in the last four months of the year. 
Some confirmation of this may be taken from the rundown in the Government's 
position at the Central Bank amounting to £232m over September and October. 
Faced with an actual out-turn for the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement in 1980 of 
£1217m and the prospect of a very large borrowing requirement in 1981, the gilt 
market has retreated and long gilt yields are now about 15.75% per annum. 
Conclusions 
Clearly, the break in the parity link with sterling and the Irish pound's 
participation in the EMS regime, marked a watershed. The manner of Exchequer 
financing and the associated changes in domestic bank liquidity became important 
influences on Irish interest rates. 
The experience to date suggests some conclusions and a few questions about 
policy. 
Public sector external financing has come to play a very significant part in 
recent years in financing not only the Exchequer deficit but also the trade deficit. As 
discussed earlier, foreign borrowing in 1975 and 1976 appeared to have little 
economic rationale as it was not required to finance the trade deficit and was applied 
mainly to build up balances at the Central Bank which were rundown a couple of 
years later. 
In 1979 the strong growth in credit and a doubling of our oil import bill, 
combined to create a very large balance of payments deficit. In addition, the fear of 
currency exposure prompted the private sector to refinance out of sterling 
borrowings into Irish pounds. 
Foreign currency borrowing by the public sector in the region of £500m was not 
enough to offset these pressures on the official external reserves and they fell by 
22%. However, it did play an important role in preventing a more serious collapse in 
external reserves. It therefore served to mitigate the liquidity squeeze and the 
cr·nsequent rise in interest rates. 
In 1980, although complete data are not yet available, it appears that there has 
again been very substantial foreign borrowing by the public sector, including the 
semi-state bodies, which has caused a marked improvement in our official external 
reserves. Because the favourable effects on bank liquidity were not fully offset by 
the actions of the Central Bank, interest rates have fallen in consequence. 
Domestic interest rates have, therefore, been lower over the last two years than 
they would have been had the public sector's credit demands been met from 
indigenous sources. But the consequences have been a very sharp rise in the net 
external liability of the public sector and continuing imbalances on Exchequer and 
trade account. 
The contribution of the Central Bank to Exchequer financing over the last two 
years has been significant. In 1979, the Government's position at the Central Bank 
was rundown by £180m in the first half and by £112m in the full year. 
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Fluctuations in the Government's position at the Central Bank are tolerable. 
But when a trend emerges as in the last three years when Government net 
indebtedness to the Central Bank has risen steadily, there may be a question about 
the appropriateness of this type of Exchequer financing. Because it seems to be 
subject to few constraints, there is a danger that the Exchequer could come to rely 
on it too heavily. 
The level of monetary financing has been very high over the past few years and 
this has implications for money supply growth which may be inappropriate to our 
circumstances as a participant in the European Monetary System. 
Non-monetary financing, which is mainly funding through the gilt market, has· 
proceeded fitfully and totally independently of the pattern of Exchequer spending. 
The bulk of net gilt sales has been concentrated in relatively short periods as in June 
and November 1979 and March-July 1980. Government balances at the Central 
Bank are r.un down when gilt sales are low and money market conditions tend to be 
easier than they otherwise would be. There is a corresponding tightening when gilt 
sales resume and Government balances are rebuilt. Arguably this complicates 
monetary control. 
A more consistent level of gilt funding could be achieved by a system of regular 
gilt auctions. This might be better suited to co-ordinating monetary and fiscal policy 
but it would involve a review of the authorities' role as market-maker. 
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